Evaluational Illusions and Skeptical Arguments
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10345692 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Steven L Reynolds (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1998 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 529-529 |
| Publication date | 1998-09-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2653755 |
| OpenAlex | W2323364722 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 4 |
A traditional diagnosis of the error in the Cartesian skeptical arguments holds that they exploit our tendencies to take a representationalist view of perception. Thinking (perhaps not too clearly) that we perceive only our own sensory states, it seems to us that our perceptual beliefs about physical objects must be justified qua explanations of those sensory states. Such justification requires us to have reasons to reject rival explanations, such as the skeptical hypotheses, which we lack. However, those who adopt the direct realist view of perception still find these arguments plausible, although, according to this diagnosis, they shouldn't. To avoid this objection, I argue that the Cartesian skeptical arguments exploit, not our representationalist tendencies, but our habits for evaluating causal explanatory justifications
Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Illusion · Skepticism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.08 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2013 - 2013 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |