What Do Easy Inferences Get Us
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10345700 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Amie L Thomasson (0000-0002-6621-5931, Department of Philosophy Dartmouth College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 102 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 736-744 |
| Publication date | 2021-05-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phpr.12769 |
| OpenAlex | W3165578540 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 8 |
In Ontology Made Easy (2015), I defend the idea that there are ‘easy’ inferences that begin from uncontroversial premises and end with answers to disputed ontological questions. But what do easy inferences really get us? Bueno and Cumpa (this journal, 2020) argue that easy inferences don’t tell us about the natures of properties —they don’t tell us what properties are . Moreover, they argue, by accepting an ontologically neutral quantifier we can also resist the conclusion that properties or numbers exist . Here I address these two issues in turn—in ways that help clarify both the scope and results of easy ontology. First, it is important to see that easy inferences were never intended to address modal questions. Modal questions are addressed by a different part of the total deflationary view—modal normativism. So understood, metaphysical modal questions nonetheless do not provide a remaining area for serious metaphysical inquiry. Second, I argue that we have reason to resist adopting an ontologically neutral quantifier, if we aim to answer ontological questions (without begging the question). Addressing these issues helps to clarify both what does (and does not) follow from easy inferences, and how they form part of a larger deflationary metametaphysical view
Begging · Causation · Deflation · Economics · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Modal · Ontology · Philosophy of science · Scope (computer science · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Highly cited | No |