The Fallacy of Calibrationism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10345735 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Yoaav Isaacs (0000-0002-7288-1850, Baylor University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 102 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 247-260 |
| Publication date | 2019-09-17 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phpr.12640 |
| OpenAlex | W2973922178 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 9 |
Calibrationism is an intuitively plausible thesis about the relation between rational credence and expected reliability. But calibrationism is misguided. It relies on the base‐rate fallacy, a classic mistake in probabilistic epistemology. Thus while calibrationism is intuitive, it cannot be correct
Credence · Economics · Epistemology · Fallacy · Mathematical economics · Mistake · Political science · Positive economics · Probabilistic logic · Relation (database · Statistics · Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science
| Citations per year | 0.8 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2026 (6) |
| Highly cited | No |