Two Aspects of Belief

One of the central problems surrounding the relation of believing is the analysis of the denotation of proper names inside belief contexts. Since Kripke's persuasive arguments against a sense or indirect theory of reference for proper names,' many philosophers have abandoned such views in favor of a direct theory of reference for names.' However, while Kripke has pointed out the difficulties of an indirect theory of reference for names, he does not offer a solution to many of the problems that motivated these views in the first place. One of these problems is the problem of substitution of co-extensive names in belief contexts. In this paper I shall argue that the problem does not, strictly speaking, lie with the direct reference theory of names, but rather in the traditional view of believing. I shall offer an alternative account of believing that is motivated in part by recent work on indexicals and that solves the difficulties of the denotation of proper names in belief contexts. The problem I wish to consider can be illustrated with the following sentences

Epistemology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment