Two Dogmas'–All Bark and No Bite? Carnap and Quine on Analyticity 1
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10345874 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paul A M Gregory (Washington and Lee University, corresponding author), PAUL A GREGORY |
| Year | 2003 |
| Volume | 67 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 633-648 |
| Publication date | 2003-11-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00311.x |
| OpenAlex | W2010189202 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 11 |
Recently O'Grady aigued that Quine's “Two Dogmas” misses its mark when Carnap's use of the analyticity distinction is understood in the light of his deflationism. While in substantial agreement with the stress on Camap's deflationism, I argue that O'Grady is not sufficiently sensitive to the difference between using the analyticity distinction to support deflationism, and taking a deflationary attitude towards the distinction itself; the latter being much more controversial. Being sensitive to this difference, and viewing Quine as having reason to insist on a non‐arbitrary analyticity distinction, we see that “Two Dogmas” makes direct contact with Carnap's deflationism. We must look beyond “Two Dogmas” to Quine's other critiques of analyticity to understand why the arbitrariness of the distinction threatens to undermine or overextend Carnap's deflationism, collapsing it into a view much like Quine's. Quine is then seen to achieve many of Carnap's ends, with the important exception of deflationism
Analytic philosophy · Arbitrariness · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Quine · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History
| Highly cited | No |
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