Gibbard on Morality and Sentiment

Allan Gibbard's book Wise Choices, Apt Feelings is clearly a major philosophical contribution, subtly argued, richly suggestive, yet elegantly and modestly presented. Though primarily focused on metaethical issues, questions of natural fact, and methodology, it is also an impressively humane and wise book. Gibbard is a noncognitivist regarding both morality and rationality, and he conceives moral judgments as primarily about the aptness of sentiments. To those who have accepted alternative perspectives on rationality and morals, Gibbard poses his challenge in a gentle way and concentrates his efforts on developing his own theory. His challenge, nonetheless, is deep and powerful. If taken in the spirit in which it is offered, it should prompt constructive responses that must be developed at length. To further discussion, though, I will sketch briefly some of Gibbard's main points and express some initial doubts. Gibbard counts himself in the noncognitivist tradition of A. J. Ayer, Charles Stevenson, and R. M. Hare, but he is sensitive both to the particular objections that the earlier noncognitivist theories have prompted and also to the ways in which developments in philosophy of language have undermined the conception of analysis out of which those theories developed. His discussion in fact addresses all of the standard objections to noncognitivism. He develops a rich account of the sort of objectivity presumed in our judgments about what is rational and moral; but he keeps Moore's open question open. That is, the weight of facts, evolutionary, psychological, or linguistic, cannot force anyone, on pain of inconsistency or abuse of language, to concede another's claims as to what is morally right or makes sense. When a person says that a kind of act, say, torture, is wrong, then, prior to moral theorizing and barring special circumstances, we typically attribute to the person a corresponding set of motives and beliefs. For example, we suppose both (a) that the person would be reluctant to engage in torture, would normally feel guilty if he did and angry if he saw others doing it, (b) that the person believes that objective standards, authoritative for himself and others, warrant his judgment or attitude. A central task for moral

Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Morality · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy