Reasons Explanations of Actions
Causal, Singular, and Situational
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10345914 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Abraham Sesshu Roth (0000-0002-0407-8441, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 839-839 |
| Publication date | 1999-12-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2653560 |
| OpenAlex | W2333194567 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 4 |
Davidson held that the explanation of action in terms of reasons was a form of causal explanation. He challenged anti-causalists to identify a non-causal relation underlying reasons-explanation which could distinguish between merely having a reason and that reason being the one for which one acts. George Wilson attempts to meet Davidson's challenge, but the relation he identifies can serve only in explanations of general facts, whereas reasons explanation is often of particular acts. This suggests that the relation underlying reasons explanation is not only causal, but singular as well. A further proposal, extracted from Fred Dretske's views, characterizes this singular causal relation in terms of non-mental triggers. But this suggestion underestimates the explanatory role of the environment at the time of action, and shares with Wilson's proposal the inability to account for the rationalization of particular acts. A situational environmentalist conception of reasons explanation, however, does not face these difficulties. Actions are often explained in terms of their reasons. Are these explanations a form of causal explanation? Davidson answers yes, and challenges those who would answer otherwise to show how, on their views, they can distinguish between merely having a reason for an action (but not acting on it), and that reason being the one for which one performs that action. Meeting this challenge is necessary for defending a genuine alternative to the causal account of reasons explanations. This paper articulates some of the significant presuppositions of Davidson's challenge and goes on to evaluate one important attempt to meet that challenge.' An interesting aspect of this anti-causalist response is its appeal to examples of teleological or functional explanation in biology and physiology as a model for a non-causal account of reasons explanation of human action. I show, however, that there is a crucial disanalogy between reasons explanation of action and the sort of explanation such examples illustrate. Reasons are often cited to explain particular acts, whereas these examples are explanations of more general facts. The disanalogy makes this strategy for a non-causal account of reasons explanation considerably less
Epistemology · Situational ethics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology
Non‐Teleological Explanations of Actions
Teleological Explanations of Actions
The Inherently Normative Nature of Action Explanations
Purposes, Causes, and Reasons Explanations
Explanations in Terms of the Agent's Reasoning
Motivation and agency
Anti-intellectualism, instructive representations, and the intentional action argument
Reasons and Purposes
| Citations per year | 0.35 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2003 - 2021 (19) |
| Highly cited | No |