Alternative of Oneself

Recasting Some of Our Practical Problems

Bibliographic Data

ID10345997
AuthorsJan Bransen (0009-0009-3603-9920, corresponding author)
Year2000
Volume60
Issue2
Pages381-381
Publication date2000-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.2307/2653491
OpenAlexW2322936607
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited14

This paper argues that there are practical problems of such a kind that neither impartial morality nor rational choice theory can provide us with comfort and guidance in our attempt to make the right choice if confronted with such a problem. It argues that both morality and rational choice theory are bound to misconstrue problems of this kind. Appreciating the limits of both morality and rational choice theory, as currently discussed in the literature (Wolf, Morton, Pettit, Hollis & Sugden), enables us to identify the features of these particular practical problems, and allows us to elaborate the idea of an alternative of oneself, which is crucial to a proper understanding of the kind of practical problem the paper draws attention to. We sometimes find it difficult to determine what would be the best thing to do. Being confronted with such a practical problem, we might look for comfort and guidance from a theory created to help us make the right choice. Morality and rational choice theory are two such theories. However, as I shall argue in this paper, these theories are of no help in some of the most important situations, situations in which one has to make choices that will have a tremendous impact on the course and character of the life one will live. My point is not, at least not in a straightforward way, that these theories are not designed for the purposes we need them for in these situations, as is the case with a hammer that is useless when we are looking for something with which to drive in a screw. No, my point is that these theories, at least as we commonly conceive of them, force us to misconstrue our choices by drawing our attention away from the most accurate description of the options from which we have to choose. It is as if, to dwell upon the metaphor, the fact that we possess a hammer forces us to think of the screw as though it were a nail. This paper is in four parts. In the first I distinguish three kinds of practical problems, suggesting that we treat one of them as a paradigm case because it combines two complications that make it particularly likely to be misconstrued by both morality and rational choice theory (namely, being about personal commitments and long-term individual projects). In the next two parts I discuss the limits of both morality and rational choice theory as these are currently recognised in the literature. I argue that understanding the nature

Cognitive science · Epistemology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology

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