Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Language
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10346228 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Danielle Macbeth (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1995 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 501-501 |
| Publication date | 1995-09-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2108436 |
| OpenAlex | W2039648319 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
1. In Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,' Sellars argues that the notion of nonverbal that would provide a foundation for empirical knowledge is a myth; nothing merely causal, not already in conceptual shape, could possibly play the justificatory role required of such a foundation. Rorty takes Quine, in Two Dogmas,2 to make the complementary point that the notion of analytic claims true by virtue of meaning, of self-authenticating verbal episodes that might provide a foundation for another sort for knowledge, is again a myth.3 A third moment in the dismantling of the myth of a foundation-this time for the contentfulness of our thoughts rather than for the truth of our beliefs-is due to Rorty himself. As he argues in Realism and Reference4 (and again in Chapter 6 of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature), the notion of reference as a nonintentional or word-world relation that would ground our thoughts' representational bearing on things, and so explain how thoughts can so much as purport to be true, again involves illicit appeal to the idea that independent of what we take it as an object can have cognitive significance. An external relation of reference cannot serve as the unmoved mover of the contentfulness or aboutness of thought. Nor, if Quine is right about the breakdown of the analytic/synthetic distinction, can meanings or word-word relations play this role. My aim here is not, however, to defend these arguments-though I will try to clarify the pragmatist's motivation for claiming that neither the concepts expressed by natural kind terms nor the objects referred to by proper names are the given building blocks of contentful thoughts. My aim is rather
Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Pragmatism · Historical Linguistics and Language Studies · Philosophy · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
| Citations per year | 0.05 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2006 - 2006 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |