The Metaphysics of Mental Files

Bibliographic Data

ID10346334
AuthorsSimon Prosser (0000-0001-7444-2782, University of St Andrews, corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume100
Issue3
Pages657-676
Publication date2019-01-21
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phpr.12577
OpenAlexW2912435494
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited34

There is much to be said for a diachronic or interpersonal individuation of singular modes of presentation ( MOP s) in terms of a criterion of epistemic transparency between thought tokens. This way of individuating MOP s has been discussed recently within the mental files framework, though the issues discussed here arise for all theories that individuate MOP s in terms of relations among tokens. All such theories face objections concerning apparent failures of the transitivity of the ‘same MOP ’ relation. For mental files, these transitivity failures most obviously occur because mental files can merge or undergo fission. In this paper I argue that this problem is easily resolved once mental files are properly construed as continuants , whose metaphysics is analogous to that of persons or physical objects. All continuants can undergo fission or fusion, leading to similar transitivity problems, but there are well‐established theories of persistence that accommodate this. I suggest that, in particular, the stage theory best suits the purposes of a continuant theory of MOP s

Epistemology · Individuation · Information retrieval · Merge (version control · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Psychoanalysis · Relation (database · Transitive relation · Computer Science · Mathematics · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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