On the Explanatory Role of Correspondence Truth
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10346358 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Philip Kitcher (0009-0009-4978-4305, Columbia University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 346-364 |
| Publication date | 2002-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00005.x |
| OpenAlex | W2092826063 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 18 |
An intuitive argument for scientific realism suggests that our successes in predicting and intervening would be inexplicable if the theories that generate them were not approximately true. This argument faces many objections, some of which are briefly addressed in this paper, and one of which is treated in more detail. The focal criticism alleges that appeals to success cannot deliver conclusions that parts of science are true in the sense of truth‐as‐correspondence that realists prefer. The paper responds to that criticism, in versions proposed by Michael Williams, Michael Levin, and, especially, Paul Horwich, by arguing that critics typically stop at a shallow level of psychological explanation. If we probe more deeply we discover a genuine explanatory role for correspondence truth
Argument (complex analysis · Criticism · Epistemology · Philosophy of science · Political science · Realism · Scientific realism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science
A Plea for Natural Philosophy
Deflating the Success-Truth Connection
Is there Verification in Theology
Science in the Age of Computer Simulation – By Eric Winsberg
Practical success and the nature of truth
Jamesian Reasonable Belief and Deweyan Religious Communities
Naturalizing Or Demythologizing Scientific Inquiry
Truth, explanation, minimalism
Models of Success Versus the Success of Models
In what sense is evolution blind to moral truth
The metaphysical issues in the social sciences and how social scientists debate them
Correspondence truth and scientific realism
Answering the conceptual challenge
Coherence, Truth, and the Development of Scientific Knowledge
Deflationism, explanation and “because”
Toward a Modest Correspondence Theory of Truth
Kitcher’s Explanatory Demand and the Appropriate-Means Requirement on Successful Action
Stand with #StandingRock
| Citations per year | 0.82 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2004 - 2025 (22) |
| Highly cited | No |