Realism, Conventionalism, and Causal Decomposition in Units of Selection

Reflections on Samir Okasha’s Evolution and the Levels of Selection

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10346367
AutoresElliott Sober (0000-0003-3130-1263, University of Wisconsin–Madison, autor de correspondencia)
Año2010
Volumen82
Número1
Páginas221-231
Fecha de publicación2010-12-29
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00471.x
OpenAlexW2064684259
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas6
Referencias citadas18

I discuss two subjects in Samir Okasha’s excellent book, Evolution and the Levels of Selection. In consonance with Okasha’s critique of the conventionalist view of the units of selection problem, I argue that conventionalists have not attended to what realists mean by group, individual, and genic selection. In connection with Okasha’s discussion of the Price equation and contextual analysis, I discuss whether the existence of these two quantitative frameworks is a challenge to realism

Conventionalism · Epistemology · Realism · Selection (genetic algorithm · Sociology · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Economic Theory and Institutions · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science