Wright Back to Dretske, or Why You Might as Well Deny Knowledge Closure

Bibliographic Data

ID10346467
AuthorsMarc Alspector‐Kelly (Western Michigan University, corresponding author)
Year2014
Volume90
Issue3
Pages570-611
Publication date2014-10-12
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phpr.12150
OpenAlexW2078277252
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited22

Fred Dretske notoriously claimed that knowledge closure sometimes fails. Crispin Wright agrees that warrant does not transmit in the relevant cases, but only because the agent must already be warranted in believing the conclusion in order to acquire her warrant for the premise. So the agent ends up being warranted in believing, and so knowing, the conclusion in those cases too: closure is preserved. Wright's argument requires that the conclusion's having to be warranted beforehand explains transmission failure. I argue that it doesn't, and that the correct explanation does not imply that the agent will end up warranted in believing the conclusion when transmission fails. Those who agree that transmission does fail in those cases, therefore, might as well follow Dretske in denying knowledge closure too

Argument (complex analysis · Art history · Closure (psychology · Economics · Epistemology · Political science · Premise · Transmission (telecommunications · Warrant · Wright · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · History · Law · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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