Knowing to infinity

Full knowledge and the margin‐for‐error principle

Bibliographic Data

ID10347212
AuthorsYonathan Fiat (0000-0003-3601-6373, MIT, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume110
Issue3
Pages1083-1113
Publication date2025-03-18
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phpr.70001
OpenAlexW4408641649
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited27

Let's say that I fully know that if I know that , I know that I know that , I know that I know that I know that , and so on. Let's say that I partially know that if I know that but I don't fully know that . What, if anything, do I fully know? What, if anything, do I partially know? One response in the literature is that I fully know everything that I know; partial knowledge is impossible. This response is in tension with a plausible margin‐for‐error principle on knowledge. A different response in the literature is that I don't fully know anything; everything that I know, I partially know. Recently, Goldstein (forthcoming, 2024) defended a third view, according to which I fully know some things and I partially know other things. While this seems plausible, Goldstein's account is based on denying the margin‐for‐error principle. In this paper, I show that the possibility of both full knowledge and partial knowledge is consistent with the margin‐for‐error principle. I also argue that the resulting picture of knowledge is well‐motivated

Calculus (dental · Epistemology · Infinity · Machine learning · Margin (machine learning · Mathematical analysis · Mathematical economics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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