Virtue Epistemology
No New Cures
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10347414 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Magnus Levin (0000-0001-7292-8084, City University of New York, corresponding author), Michael Levin (0000-0003-2767-6919) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 69 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 397-410 |
| Publication date | 2004-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00401.x |
| OpenAlex | W2053790566 |
| Language | EN |
One version of virtue epistemology defines knowledge as belief whose truth arises from, or is explained by, the motives that produced it. This version is also intended to solve the Gettier problem, by shielding properly caused beliefs from double accidents. Unfortunately, there is no notion of “explains” or “arises from” which explains in the intended sense the truth of true beliefs
Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Virtue · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Ethics in medical practice · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
|---|