You Can Always Count on Reliabilism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10347833 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Magnus Levin (0000-0001-7292-8084, corresponding author), Michael Levin (0000-0003-2767-6919) |
| Year | 1997 |
| Volume | 57 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 607-607 |
| Publication date | 1997-09-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2953752 |
| OpenAlex | W2315021209 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 8 |
This article considers some recent objections to reliabilism, particularly those of Susan Haack in Evidence and Inquiry. Haack complains that reliabilism solves the ratification problem trivially, making it analytic that evidence relates to truth; this paper defends an analytic solution to this problem. It argues as well that reliabilism is not tacitly committed to evidentialism. Familiar counterexamples to and repairs of reliabilism are reviewed, with an eye to finding their rationale. Finally, it suggests that the underlying dispute between reliabilism and its critics is the existence of a priori relations between evidence and hypotheses. From the late 1960s to the early 1980's, reliabilism was in vogue.' Since then it has become decreasingly fashionable, with many contemporary writers rejecting it outright. An instance very much in point is Haack's recent Evi
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Highly cited | No |
|---|