The Predicative Predicament

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10347945
AutoresAnders J Schoubye (University of Edinburgh, autor correspondente)
Ano2016
Volume96
Fascículo3
Páginas571-595
Data de publicação2016-11-07
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phpr.12336
OpenAlexW2553337061
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas9
Referências citadas21

The ‐Predicativism is the view that names are count nouns. For example, the meaning of the name ‘Louise’ is roughly the property of being called Louise. Moreover, proponents of this view maintain that names that are ostensibly in argument position of a predicate are covert definite descriptions. In recent years, The ‐Predicativism has acquired a number of new supporters, mainly Elbourne ( ), Matushansky ( ), and Fara ( ). And while it was pointed out by Kripke ( ) that these kinds of views generally struggle with capturing the rigidity of proper names, these new views are alleged to solve this problem. In this paper I argue that the more recent versions of the view continue to struggle. In particular, I show that the views fail to provide an explanatory and/or empirically adequate analysis of rigidity. My discussions of these views are then supplemented with a general diagnosis of the problem and an explanation of why it is unlikely to be solved by The ‐Predicativism

Argument (complex analysis · Covert · Epistemology · Linguistics · Meaning (existential · Metaphysics · Noun · Philosophy of language · Predicate (mathematical logic · Predicative expression · Proper noun · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science