What the Deflationist May Say About Truthmaking
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 10348024 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Morag Mcgrath (0000-0003-2055-6914, University of Missouri, autor correspondente), Matthew Mcgrath |
| Ano | 2003 |
| Volume | 66 |
| Fascículo | 3 |
| Páginas | 666-688 |
| Data de publicação | 2003-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00283.x |
| OpenAlex | W2047608765 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 9 |
| Referências citadas | 20 |
The correspondence theory of truth is often thought to be supported by the intuition that if a proposition (sentence, belief) is true, then something makes it true. I argue that this appearance is illusory and is sustained only by a conflation of two distinct notions of truthmaking, existential and non‐existential. Once the conflation is exposed, I maintain, deflationism is seen to be adequate for accommodating truthmaking intuitions
Conflation · Epistemology · Existentialism · Intuition · Linguistics · Proposition · Sentence · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Truth and Social Reality
A Theory of Truthmaking
The best thing about the deflationary theory of truth
Reconciling Deflationism and Satisfaction Semantics
Deflationism and truthmaking
Is there a dilemma for the truthmaker non-maximalist
Deflationism and the primary truth bearer
Deflationism, explanation and “because”
Deflating Deflationary Truthmaking
| Obras citantes distintas | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,56 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2010 - 2026 (17) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 9 |