Tense, Timely Action and Self-Ascription
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10348248 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Stephan Torres (0000-0003-2296-839X, Thiel College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 80 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 112-132 |
| Publication date | 2009-12-28 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00312.x |
| OpenAlex | W2059141632 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 14 |
I consider whether the self-ascription theory can succeed in providing a tenseless (B-theoretic) account of tensed belief and timely action. I evaluate an argument given by William Lane Craig for the conclusion that the self-ascription account of tensed belief entails a tensed theory (A-theory) of time. I claim that how one formulates the self-ascription account of tensed belief depends upon whether one takes the subject of self-ascription to be a momentary person-stage or an enduring person. I provide two different formulations of the self-ascription account of tensed belief, one that is compatible with a perdurantist account of persons and the other that is compatible with an endurantist account of persons. I argue that a self-ascription account of tensed beliefs for enduring subjects most plausibly involves the self-ascription of relations rather than properties. I argue that whether one takes the subject of self-ascription to be a momentary person-stage or an enduring person, the self-ascription theory provides a plausible B-theoretic account of how tensed belief and timely action are possible
Action (physics · Argument (complex analysis · Ascription · Causal theory of reference · Epistemology · Subject (documents · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |