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Free Will and Scientiphicalism

Bibliographic Data

ID10348268
AuthorsPeter Unger (New York University, corresponding author)
Year2002
Volume65
Issue1
Pages1-25
Publication date2002-07-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00180.x
OpenAlexW2162212710
LanguageEN
Citations received3

It's been agreed for decades that not only does Determinism pose a big problem for our choosing from available alternatives, but its denial seems to pose a bit of a problem, too. It's argued here that only Determinism, and not its denial, means no real choice for us. But, what explains the appeal of the thought that, where things aren't fully determined, to that extent they're just a matter of chance? It's the dominance of metaphysical suppositions that, together, comprise Scientiphicalism: Wholly composed of such mindless physical parts as electrons, you are a being whose powers are all physical powers, physically deriving from the powers of your parts and their physical arrangements. Scientiphicalism conflicts with your having real choice. Some fairly conservative alternatives to Scientiphicalism may allow for choice. Two are briefly discussed: On the further‐fetched, you are a Cartesian mental being, a nonphysical being in powerful interaction with physical things. On the more conservative approach, you are wholly composed of physical parts, but some of your powers are radically emergent, including your power to choose. Finally, it's argued that, if you choose, you must be, to some extent, exempt from natural laws

Appeal · Denial · Determinism · Dominance (genetics · Epistemology · Free will · Law and economics · Metaphysics · Natural (archaeology · Political science · Psychoanalysis · Sociology · History · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Space Science and Extraterrestrial Life

  • What kinds of alternative possibilities are required of the folk concept(s) of choice

    Open Access•Jason Shepard, Aneyn M O'Grady et al.•Consciousness and Cognition•2016

  • Fine tuning and the varieties of naturalism

    Open Access•GREGORY E GANSSLE•Religious Studies•2011

  • The Hard Problem of the Many

    Open Access•Jonathan Simon•Philosophical Perspectives•2017

Citations per year0.2
Citation span2011 - 2017 (7)
Highly citedNo

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