Knowledge and the Internal Revisited 1

Bibliographic Data

ID10350883
AuthorsJohn Mcdowell (0009-0004-1645-4653, University of Pittsburgh, corresponding author)
Year2002
Volume64
Issue1
Pages97-105
Publication date2002-01-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00144.x
OpenAlexW2054668717
LanguageEN
Citations received13

In “Knowledge and the Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons,” Robert Brandom reads my “Knowledge and the Internal” as sketching a position that, when properly elaborated, opens into his own social‐perspectival conception of knowledge (and of objectivity in general). But this depends on taking me to hold that there cannot be justification for a belief sufficient to exclude the possibility that the belief is false. And that is exactly what I argued against in “Knowledge and the Internal.” Seeing that P constitutes falsehood‐excluding justification for believing that P. That should seem common sense, but it is made unavailable by the inferentialist conception of justification that Brandom takes for granted. So far from realizing my aims, Brandom's social‐perspectival conception of knowledge is squarely in the target area of my argument in “Knowledge and the Internal,” which I restate here so as to bring that out

Argument (complex analysis · Articulation (sociology · Epistemology · Objectivity (philosophy · Political science · Received view of theories · Social knowledge · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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