Berkeley and Scepticism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10351471 |
|---|---|
| Authors | George S Pappas (0000-0002-7666-8723, corresponding author), George Pappas (0000-0003-1673-9689) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 133-133 |
| Publication date | 1999-03-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2653461 |
| OpenAlex | W2072388977 |
| Language | EN |
In both the Principles and the Three Dialogues, Berkeley claims that he wants to uncover those principles which lead to scepticism; to refute those principles; and to refute scepticism itself. This paper examines the principles Berkeley says have scepticial consequences, and contends that only one of them implies scepticism. It is also argued that Berkeley's attempted refutation of scepticism rests not on his acceptance of the esse est percipi principle, but rather on the thesis that physical objects and their sensible qualities are immediately perceived
Epistemology · Skepticism · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophy
| Highly cited | No |
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