Content and Causation in Perception

In order to feel' that there is an abrasive surface beneath your hand, you must have a haptic experience which is caused by an abrasive surface beneath your hand. In order to hear your car's engine starting, you must have an aural experience which is caused by your car's engine starting. In order to see the tallest man in the world, you must have a visual experience which is caused by the tallest man in the world. And so on. But even if you have a sense experience of an appropriate type which is caused by something, this is not enough for you to perceive it. A consideration of examples establishes that it is also necessary for your experience to have a content which fits the state of affairs, event, or thing perceived. It is worth getting clear on this distinction before we proceed. In my terminology, perceiving that P is state of affairs perception, perceiving x being F-or x F-ing-is event perception, and perceiving a particular, x, simpliciter is thing perception. Thus, feeling that there is an abrasive surface beneath your hand is a case of state of affairs perception, hearing your car's engine starting is a case of event perception, and seeing the tallest man in the world is a case of thing perception. I frequently ignore this distinction and talk simply of objects of perception when I do not wish to differentiate between states of affairs, events, and things. In fact the distinction is one which holds between the truth conditions of three (idealised) types of perceptual statement rather than between three types of perception, and I draw attention to it mainly because there are subtle differences between these truth conditions which might otherwise lead to confusion. To see that a fitting content is necessary for perception, consider the following cases, which also illustrate how the required degree of fit varies between state of affairs, event, and thing perception. (a) If, as a result of the work of a perverse hypnotist, an abrasive surface beneath your hand causes you to have an experience of warm liquid surround

Analytic philosophy · Causation · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Perception · Philosophy of mind · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy · Psychology

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