Epistemic standards and minimally responsive beliefs
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10352146 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Federico Bongiorno (0000-0002-1961-5852, Centre of Philosophy University of Lisbon Lisbon Portugal, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 111 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 260-279 |
| Publication date | 2025-06-14 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phpr.70024 |
| OpenAlex | W4411310250 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 63 |
It is widely held that beliefs respond to evidence. However, it is not easy to make precise exactly in which sense beliefs are so responsive. In this paper, I develop and defend a novel minimalist account of evidence‐responsiveness. I argue that in order for an attitude A to count as minimally responsive to the evidence, e , the attitude holder must follow at least one epistemic standard which appropriately explains her holding A given e . The account given here allows that attitudes may still show responsiveness in this minimal sense, even in cases where we ignore evidence against them or when we lack the capacity to revise them. It also offers a systematic way of demarcating the boundaries between beliefs and other attitudes like imaginings and acceptances. While beliefs are not the sole attitudes whose evidence relations are bound by epistemic standards, beliefs and non‐beliefs undergo different forms of regulation
Epistemology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology
Advances In Experimental Social Psychology
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories
A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
Belief's Own Ethics
Recreative Minds
Debunking
Religious credence is not factual belief
Alief in Action (and Reaction)
Repetition increases perceived truth equally for plausible and implausible statements
Frequency and the conference of referential validity
Belief and Acceptance
An introduction to cognitive dissonance theory and an overview of current perspectives on the theory.
What is inference?
Is Earth a perfect square? Repetition increases the perceived truth of highly implausible statements
Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles
Delusions as Epistemic Hypervigilance
Epistemic Permissiveness
Polarization is epistemically innocuous
Social epistemological conception of delusion
Delusional evidence-responsiveness
Do great minds really think alike
Doxastic Deliberation
Evidential Preemption
Rational Polarization
Perseverance in self-perception and social perception
Perseverance of social theories
Ingroup favoritism in cooperation
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |