The Ethical Advantages of Free Will Subjectivism

Adopting meta‐level Free Will Subjectivism is one among several ways to maintain that persons never experience moral freedom in their choices. The other ways of arguing against moral freedom I consider are presented by Saul Smilansky, Ted Honderich, Bruce Waller, Galen Strawson, and Derk Pereboom. In this paper, without arguing for the acceptance of free will subjectivism, I argue that subjectivism has some moral and theoretical advantages over its kindred theories

Epistemology · Free will · Subjectivism · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification

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