Forgiveness and Standing
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10352286 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kevin Zaragoza (Yale University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 84 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 604-621 |
| Publication date | 2010-05-27 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00361.x |
| OpenAlex | W1927371220 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 10 |
Despite broad agreement that forgiveness involves overcoming resentment, the small philosophical literature on this topic has made little progress in determining which of the many ways of overcoming resentment is forgiveness. In a recent paper, however, Pamela Hieronymi proposed a way forward by requiring that accounts of forgiveness be “articulate” and “uncompromising.” I argue for these requirements, but also claim that Hieronymi’s proposed articulate and uncompromising account must be rejected because it cannot accommodate the fact that only some agents have the standing to forgive. I end by sketching an alternative account which, I claim, explains the phenomenon of standing
Epistemology · Forgiveness · Phenomenon · Political science · Resentment · Forgiveness and Related Behaviors · Free Will and Agency · Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
Forgiveness and the Problem of Repeated Offences
The Procedural Nature of Moral Standing
Hypocrisy, Standing to Blame and Second‐Personal Authority
Forgiveness
Forgiving the Mote in Your Sister’s Eye
Personal Reactive Attitudes and Partial Responses to Others
The Possibility of Preemptive Forgiving
The Beam and the Mote
| Citations per year | 0.89 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2017 - 2025 (9) |
| Highly cited | No |