Hung Parliaments and the Need for Clearer Rules of Government Formation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10359779 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Petra Schleiter (0000-0002-1150-0954, corresponding author), Valerie Belu, Robert Hazell (0000-0002-2571-1090) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 88 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 404-411 |
| Publication date | 2017-07-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Political Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0032-3179 • E-ISSN: 1467-923X |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-923x.12399 |
| OpenAlex | W2737009765 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
The general elections of 2017 and 2010 produced hung parliaments in which no single party could command an overall majority; in May 2015 the UK only narrowly avoided that outcome. When a parliament is hung, more than one potential government can be viable, and the constitutional rules that determine who has the first right to form the government can thus have a decisive influence on which government forms. In the past, the UK has applied several potentially contradictory rules (based on conventions and principles), which do not all follow an equally democratic logic. This status quo is problematic because it can generate political controversy and uncertainty, in addition to jeopardising the Monarch's role in the government formation process. A reform that enables parliament to elect the leader who will be tasked with the formation of the next government would resolve these problems and provide constitutional clarity
CLARITY · Democracy · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Parliament · Political science · Politics · Process (computing · Sociology · Status quo · Chemistry · Computer Science · Law · Political Systems and Governance · Public Administration
| Citations per year | 0.22 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2017 - 2019 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |