Deficits without End

Much of the criticism of Congress since 1980 in effect asked legislators to be who they aren't elite analysts responding to conventional policy wisdom -instead of elected representatives. An examination of the political economy of legislators shows fiscal concerns flow naturally from the duties of jobs. One duty of representatives is to reflect opinions back home, and this lawmakers did relatively well, particularly in defending their programs. The public wanted budget balance, but not at any price, and so did representatives. The Burkean plea to regard the common interest above that of one's constituents is compelling, when such an alternative can be carefully crafted. It could seldom be so crafted after 1980 because of the impediments of program politics and the confusion (and frequent error) in elite circles over the proper stabilization course. Legislators did not follow elite policy advice very well, but that advice was often wrong about the immediate effects of deficits. Deficits persist because accurate representation can lead on its merits to dubious policy. Collectively, lawmakers' intentions produce a large problem of policy choice. Students of public decisions often laud policy rationality in which the most efficient means to clearly ordered goals is employed. But how to order goals when they diverge on both the spending parts and fiscal whole? The only way to proceed is via politics. All that ensures, though, is that the decision made will satisfy a majority of legislators, on representative grounds, in which budget parts figure most prominently. Political rationality requires calculating political

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