Vote Trading

An Attempt at Clarification

Bibliographic Data

ID10382098
AuthorsClifford S Russell (0000-0003-0324-0993, Resources For The Future, corresponding author)
Year1979
Volume27
Issue1
Pages54-70
Publication date1979-03-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0032-3217 • E-ISSN: 1467-9248
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9248.1979.tb01187.x
OpenAlexW2103523491
LanguageEN
Citations received1

The aim of this paper is to clarify the continuing debate about the theoretical characteristics of vote trading. It sets about this by first emphasizing existing distinctions among types of vote trading systems, most importantly, the distinction between trades on entire platforms characterizing social states (implicit vote trading) and trades on the individual issues making up the platforms (explicit vote trading). The subdivisions of the latter type are more carefully explored, with the key results being that: while all vote trading systems may lead to circularity in the attempt to choose; and while implicit vote trading inevitably involves such circularity; vote trading over individual, independent issues may be stable. The challenge to the social choice field is therefore to be more careful in specifying the conditions of foresight, renegotiability and the like, and to compare theoretical systems for explicit vote trading with actual legislative rules

Algorithmic trading · Alternative trading system · Computer security · Contingent vote · Economics · Field (mathematics · Financial economics · Futures studies · Group voting ticket · Key (lock · Law and economics · Legislature · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Voting · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance · Digital Platforms and Economics · Law · Mathematics · Merger and Competition Analysis

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