The more‐than‐minimal state defended against Nozick
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10383074 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bruce Talbot Coram (Australian National University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1988 |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 56-61 |
| Publication date | 1988-05-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0032-3268 • E-ISSN: 1467-9256 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00323268808402046 |
| OpenAlex | W2226008050 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
Robert Nozick's book, Anarchy, State, and Utopia provides one of the most influential statements of the argument that the welfare state is lacking in moral justification because it infringes property rights. Most previous criticisms of Nozick's work have been concerned to reject the concept of abstract individual rights that forms his starting point. While sound, these criticisms may have little influence on those who find the concept of abstract rights plausible. In this paper Nozick's assumptions about rights are accepted and it is shown that a much more extensive state than Nozick's minimal defensive agency can be supported. Under the specified conditions this stage does not violate these rights. If so much of the argument of those who accept abstract rights is undermined
Agency (philosophy · Argument (complex analysis · Epistemology · Law and economics · Political science · Property rights · Sociology · State (computer science · Utopia · Free Will and Agency · Law · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
| Highly cited | No |
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