Agents of Influence
Country Directors at the World Bank
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10392467 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Patrick Weller (0000-0002-8953-1195, Griffith University), Xu Yi-Chong, Xu Yi‐chong (0000-0001-6823-8013, Griffith University) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 88 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 211-231 |
| Publication date | 2010-01-28 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Public Administration (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0033-3298 • E-ISSN: 1467-9299 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2010.01801.x |
| OpenAlex | W2112784255, W4244598290 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 15 |
| References cited | 20 |
This article seeks to understand the operations of the World Bank by examining one particular group of players—the country directors (CDs). It argues that the analysis of international organizations (IOs), by focusing on the behaviour of their principals (states), as principal-agent analysts do, or on organizational cultures, as the constructivist approach does, is inadequate in explaining the operation and behaviour of IOs, which are themselves complex organizations with chains of cascading relationships. Country directors at the World Bank occupy a pivotal position in this chain: with executive directors and the president as their nominal and ultimate principals, vice presidents as their direct principals and client countries as informal principals. They are themselves principals to their country team and to some sector people. For both conceptual and empirical reasons, therefore, CDs deserve separate analysis. To explain the way these relationships shape the work CDs do and how they do it, this article examines three basic functions of country directors at the Bank: (1) representing the Bank to the client countries; (2) representing the country to the Bank; and (3) managing the country offices and country programmes. The empirical section of this article is based on interviews with over 80 officials in both Washington and field offices. We show that an understanding of the Bank and its operations requires an examination of its internal processes and its staff
Business · Developing country · Economic growth · Economics · Empirical research · Political science · Position (finance · Principal (computer security · Public relations · Work (physics · Accounting · European Union Policy and Governance · Finance · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · International Business and FDI · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy
Orchestration and transnational climate governance
Issue congruence in international organizations
Reforming the World Bank from Within
Conflicts of Interest in International Organizations
Comparing the autonomy of international public administrations
Representative bureaucracy, international organizations and public service bargains
Policy recommendations of international bureaucracies
Local Knowledges in International Peacebuilding
Translations of policy templates by international organizations’ country offices
A different two-level game
Always Vote for Principle, Though You May Vote Alone
With a little help from my friends
Cross‐level coordination among international organizations
International Bureaucrats and Organizational Performance. Country-Specific Knowledge and Sectoral Knowledge in World Bank Projects
Bureaucratic Representation and Gender Mainstreaming in International Organizations
The World Bank since Bretton Woods
Hypocrisy Trap
Lending Credibility
How agents matter
Rules for the World
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Traditions of governance
To Be, but Not to Be Seen’
Banking on the poor
Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community
Why States Act through Formal International Organizations
Delegation to International Organizations
The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations
The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa
| Citations per year | 1.25 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2014 - 2026 (13) |
| Highly cited | No |