Retracted
Setting the Regulatory Agenda: Statutory Deadlines and the Conditions for Compliance
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10396156 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Anthony M Bertelli (0000-0002-0756-5691, Bocconi University), Kathleen M Doherty (University of Southern California), Kathleen Doherty (0000-0002-0122-0123, Southern California University for Professional Studies) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 79 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 618-618 |
| Publication date | 2019-04-30 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Public Administration Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0033-3352 • E-ISSN: 1540-6210 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/puar.13057 |
| OpenAlex | W2943144495 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 20 |
Retraction : Anthony M. Bertelli, Kathleen M. Doherty, “Setting the Regulatory Agenda: Statutory Deadlines and the Conditions for Compliance, ( https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/puar.13057 ).” This article from Public Administration Review , published online on April 30, 2019 in Wiley Online Library ( wileyonlinelibrary.com ), has been retracted by agreement between the journal's Editors‐in‐chief, R. Paul Battaglio and Jeremy L. Hall, the authors, and Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This action has been agreed due to an error which caused an incorrect version of the manuscript to be published. The correct version of the article is forthcoming
Compliance (psychology · Law and economics · Library science · Political science · Sociology · Statutory law · Computer Science · Criminal Law and Evidence · Law · Psychology · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Social Psychology
Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process
Who Controls the Bureaucracy?
The presidential power of unilateral action
Bureaucratic Red Tape and Formalization
The Complications of Controlling Agency Time Discretion
Agencies by Presidential Design
Slow-Rolling, Fast-Tracking, and the Pace of Bureaucratic Decisions in Rulemaking
Political Transaction Costs and the Politics of Administrative Design
The Administrative Presidency as Reactive Oversight
Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences
Time and Rulemaking
Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Performance
Credibility and Agency Termination under Parliamentarism
Learning under Pressure
Galloping Elephants
Regulatory Delay and Rulemaking Deadlines
Does Public Service Performance Affect Top Management Turnover
What Makes an Agency Independent
Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation
Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions
| Highly cited | No |
|---|