Imperfect Federalism

The Intergovernmental Partnership for Homeland Security

Bibliographic Data

ID10400328
AuthorsPeter K Eisinger (New School, corresponding author), Peter Eisinger
Year2006
Volume66
Issue4
Pages537-545
Publication date2006-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePublic Administration Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0033-3352 • E-ISSN: 1540-6210
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00614.x
OpenAlexW2079805107
LanguageEN
Citations received11
References cited4

The terror attacks of September 11, 2001, posed a set of security challenges for the nation's cities that the increasingly decentralized federal system was poorly prepared to meet. Although it was generally agreed that domestic security required a close intergovernmental partnership, strong national leadership and support were lacking in creating and guiding this partnership. To make matters more difficult, political considerations in Congress generally trumped the assessment of security risks in the distribution of federal fiscal aid. This article explores the strains in the intergovernmental homeland security partnership, their causes, and efforts to adapt and reform. Despite some progress toward a more rational public administration of homeland security, the partnership still reflects the deficiencies of imperfect federalism

Administration (probate law · Federalism · General partnership · Homeland · Homeland security · Imperfect · National security · Political science · Politics · Security studies · Terrorism · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Law · Military and Defense Studies · Public Administration