Setting the Regulatory Agenda
Statutory Deadlines, Delay, and Responsiveness
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10401095 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Anthony M Bertelli (0000-0002-0756-5691, Bocconi University), Kathleen M Doherty (University of Southern California), Kathleen Doherty (0000-0002-0122-0123, Southern California University for Professional Studies, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 79 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 710-720 |
| Publication date | 2019-06-24 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Public Administration Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0033-3352 • E-ISSN: 1540-6210 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/puar.13082 |
| OpenAlex | W2951994953 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 19 |
Congress imposes statutory deadlines in an attempt to influence agency regulatory agendas, but agencies regularly fail to meet them. What explains agency responsiveness to statutory deadlines? Taking a transaction cost politics approach, the authors develop a theory of responsiveness to deadlines centered on political feasibility to explain how agency managers map rulemaking onto calendar and political time. This theory is tested on all unique rules with statutory deadlines published in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions between 1995 and 2012. The argument and findings about the timing and ultimate promulgation of rules have implications that reorient the study of the regulatory agenda from legal and political into more managerial terms
Agency (philosophy · Argument (complex analysis · Business · Economics · Law and economics · Lawmaking · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Promulgation · Regulatory agency · Rulemaking · Sociology · Statutory law · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research · Regulation and Compliance Studies
The Pivotal and Distributive Politics of Senate‐Confirmed Appointee Vacancies
Bowling Alone, Rigor, and the Decline of Social Capital in Academic Service
Reputation‐Sourced Authority and the Prospect of Unchecked Bureaucratic Power
Handmaidens of the legislature? Understanding regulatory timing
Bureaucratic Politics
Reputation and Power
The Political Economy of Public Administration
The Particularistic President
The presidential power of unilateral action
Regression Models and Life-Tables
Polarized America
Event History Modeling
The Complications of Controlling Agency Time Discretion
Reputation and Public Administration
Slow-Rolling, Fast-Tracking, and the Pace of Bureaucratic Decisions in Rulemaking
Political Transaction Costs and the Politics of Administrative Design
The Administrative Presidency as Reactive Oversight
Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences
Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Performance
Transactional Authority and Bureaucratic Politics
Galloping Elephants
Regulatory Delay and Rulemaking Deadlines
What Makes an Agency Independent
| Citations per year | 0.71 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2019 - 2023 (5) |
| Highly cited | No |