In Defense of Cooper v. Aaron
Distinguishing among Judicial Supremacy Claims
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10438367 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Katy J Harriger (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 78 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 443-465 |
| Publication date | 2016-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Review of Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-6705 • E-ISSN: 1748-6858 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0034670516000346 |
| OpenAlex | W2471042036 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 3 |
In the debate about the legitimacy of judicial supremacy, Cooper v. Aaron , the Little Rock desegregation case, is identified by both sides as critical to their argument. Defenders insist that Cooper exemplifies the need for a final authority in matters constitutional. Critics argue that the Court was wrong as a matter of democratic theory or empirical reality. In this article I argue that while it is true as a matter of empirical reality that the Court's interpretation is not the final word, the Court's assertion can be defended nonetheless. Relying on archival sources from the case, I explore the conditions under which the Court made the claim. To defend Cooper, however, does not require the defense of all assertions of judicial supremacy. I conclude by offering a preliminary analysis of how we might distinguish between more legitimate assertions of judicial supremacy and less legitimate ones
Argument (complex analysis · Assertion · Constitutional Interpretation · Desegregation · Interpretation (philosophy · Judicial review · Law and economics · Legitimacy · Political science · Politics · Racism · Sociology · Supreme court · White supremacy · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Law, Rights, and Freedoms · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Philosophy
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |