Rationality, coherence, and reasons responsiveness

In Nora Heinzelmann's recent ‘Rationality is not Coherence,’ she sets out a novel and forceful challenge for coherence accounts of rationality (henceforth: CRs). Heinzelmann argues that, first, there are cases in which the norms in CRs generate conflict and, thus, agents cannot be rational; but, second, it is counterintuitive that agents cannot be rational in these cases; and, third, reasons responsiveness accounts of rationality (henceforth: RRs) do not have this counterintuitive result. From this, Heinzelmann concludes that RRs are superior to CRs. In this article, I argue that Heinzelmann is mistaken. In Section I, I introduce the two CR norms on which Heinzelmann focuses, Enkrasia and Persistence of Intention. In Section II, I discuss Heinzelmann's argument against Enkrasia. In Section III, I discuss Heinzelmann's argument against the conjunction of Enkrasia and Persistence of Intention

Coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) · Economics · Epistemology · Physics · Positive economics · Quantum mechanics · Rationality · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Complex Systems and Decision Making · Philosophy

• Rationality Through Reasoning

  Open Access•Ernest Sosa, John Broome•Rationality Through Reasoning•2013

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