Reid on Consciousness
Hop, Hot or For
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10688152 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Rebecca Copenhaver (0000-0002-7267-9193, Lewis & Clark College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 57 |
| Issue | 229 |
| Pages | 613-634 |
| Publication date | 2007-10-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.499.x |
| OpenAlex | W1993387415 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 13 |
Thomas Reid claims to share Locke's view that consciousness is a kind of inner sense. This is puzzling, given the role the inner‐sense theory plays in indirect realism and in the theory of ideas generally. I argue that Reid does not in fact hold an inner‐sense theory of consciousness and that his view differs importantly from contemporary higher‐order theories of consciousness. For Reid, consciousness is a first‐order representational process in which a mental state with a particular content suggests the application of recognitional concepts in forming beliefs or judgements to the effect that one is currently undergoing a state with that content. I take up the question of whether Reid's theory leads to a regress, and I argue that while the regress cannot be eliminated, it is mitigated by the non‐hierarchical nature of Reid's theory of mind
Common sense · Consciousness · Content (measure theory) · Economics · Electromagnetic theories of consciousness · Epistemology · Order (exchange) · Realism · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Historical Philosophy and Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
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