Resolving Paradoxes In Judgment Aggregation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10688648 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Davide Rizza (0000-0002-1375-371X, University of East Anglia, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 62 |
| Issue | 247 |
| Pages | 337-354 |
| Publication date | 2012-04-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.00018.x |
| OpenAlex | W2130997150 |
| Language | EN |
When a law court makes a decision based on the individual deliberation of each judge, a case of judgment aggregation occurs. The possibility that the aggregation's outcome be logically inconsistent, even though it is based on consistent individual judgments, arises relatively easily and has been the subject of several investigations. In this paper I show that this paradoxical behaviour is the effect of decision procedures that are unable to discriminate between logically consistent and logically inconsistent individual judgments. The paradoxes can be resolved by selecting procedures that are not affected by this limitation
Epistemology · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Philosophy
| Highly cited | No |
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