The Instability of Vague Terms
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10689288 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Anna Mahtani (0000-0003-1581-4325, University of Sheffield, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue | 217 |
| Pages | 570-576 |
| Publication date | 2004-10-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00373.x |
| OpenAlex | W2154930757 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 5 |
Timothy Williamson's response to the question why we cannot know where the sharp boundaries marked by vague terms lie involves the claim that vague terms are unstable. Several theorists would not accept this claim, and it is tempting to think that this gives them a good objection to Williamson. By clarifying the structure of Williamson's response to the title question, I show that this objection is wrong‐headed, and reveal a new line of attack
Epistemology · Instability · Mechanics · Physics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citations per year | 0.14 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2019 - 2019 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |