David Hume

Russell Hardin's book is really about Hume's political philosophy. This is not surprising in the light of his view that Hume does not in fact have a moral philosophy. What Hume does have, according to Hardin, is a moral psychology. Hume's account of morals ‘does not tell us what is right or wrong, good or bad. It explains moral views; it does not justify them or even argue for them beyond fitting them to the actual psychology of people’ (p. 28). Several times Hardin declares that for Hume moral beliefs cannot be true or false. Moral beliefs merely express attitudes and sentiments. Sweeping aside both ‘the classical view that reason is in control and that it defines our ends and masters our passions’ and ‘any theological underpinning for morality’, Hume embraces strict naturalism of a kind that might be taken up and pushed further by ‘a Darwinian’. ‘His project is therefore virtually unique in the history of moral philosophy up until his time’, Hardin informs the reader; ‘It can rightly be called a social scientific enquiry’ (p. 28)

Aside · Epistemology · Moral philosophy · Moral psychology · Morality · Naturalism · Passions · Politics · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics