On Frege’s Assimilation of Sentences with Names
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10689607 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dongwoo Kim (0000-0002-0404-2414, The Graduate Center of the City University of New York, New York, USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 71 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 241-263 |
| Publication date | 2021-03-18 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqaa041 |
| OpenAlex | W3035652907 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 5 |
I shall discuss some of the issues concerning a notorious doctrine of Frege that sentences are names of truth-values. I am interested in a problem raised by Kripke that the doctrine obscures the distinction between judgeable and unjudgeable contents. I shall present what I take to be Frege’s account of judgeable content: a proper expression of a judgeable content is susceptible to an analysis into a predicate and an argument-word, where a predicate is understood as a concept-word used to attribute a certain property to the referent of the argument-word. In the light of this analysis, I shall argue that the doctrine does not obscure the distinction. The problem will also be discussed within the formal context of Grundgesetze. A new light will be shed on his rather peculiar conception of the symbol ‘ ${\boldsymbol \vdash}$’
Argument (complex analysis) · Doctrine · Epistemology · Linguistics · Predicate (mathematical logic) · Proper noun · Referent · Theology · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Highly cited | No |
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