Two Kinds of Holism About Values
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10689649 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Campbell Brown (0000-0001-9821-9710, University of Edinburgh, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 57 |
| Issue | 228 |
| Pages | 456-463 |
| Publication date | 2007-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.490.x |
| OpenAlex | W2004437340 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 3 |
I compare two kinds of holism about values: G.E. Moore's ‘organic unities’, and Jonathan Dancy's ‘value holism’. I propose a simple formal model for representing evaluations of parts and wholes. I then define two conditions, additivism and invariabilism, which together imply a third, atomism. Since atomism is absurd, we must reject one of the former two conditions. This is where Moore and Dancy part company: whereas Moore rejects additivism, Dancy rejects invariabilism. I argue that Moore's view is more plausible. Invariabilism ought to be retained because (a) it eliminates the needless multiplication of values inherent in variable evaluations, and (b) it preserves a certain necessary connection between values and reasons, which Dancy himself endorses
Epistemology · Holism · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,43 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2022 (4) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |