Knowing-Attributions as Endorsements
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10690213 |
|---|---|
| Authors | J R Cameron (University of Aberdeen, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1997 |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue | 186 |
| Pages | 19-37 |
| Publication date | 1997-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9213.00044 |
| OpenAlex | W2100845413 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 5 |
In saying ‘N knows that p’, where the supposed knowing is gained through rational reflection (the paradigm form of knowing, conceptually), I endorse N’s belief as rationally held, and hence correct (the ‘RhCB’ analysis). We understand this ‘hence’ not as ‘hence, infallibly’ but as ‘hence in fact’– a reliability reading, not implying infallibility (cf. the use of ‘hence’ to attribute non‐deterministic causation). The false appearance of inconsistency in our taking knowing to require an infallible guarantee of correctness while regularly attributing knowledge where we lack an absolute guarantee arises from misreading of the ‘hence’ as implying infallibility, partly due to the mistaken assumption that ‘know’ functions purely descriptively. Though aware that rationality may occasionally fail to ensure correctness, we accept it as sufficing to yield knowledge wherever it does not fail – a consistent non‐infallibilist understanding of what knowing requires
Algorithm · Attribution · Causation · Correctness · Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Infallibility · Linguistics · Rationality · Reading (process) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
|---|