Death and Decline
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10690422 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Aaron Thieme (0000-0003-1538-5639, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 73 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 248-257 |
| Publication date | 2022-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqac011 |
| OpenAlex | W4225746991 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 14 |
In this paper, I investigate backward-looking accounts of death's badness. I begin by reviewing deprivationism—the standard, forward-looking account of death's badness. On deprivationism, death is bad for its victims when it deprives them of a good future. This account famously faces two problems—Lucretius’s symmetry problem and the preemption problem. This motivates turning to backward-looking accounts of death's badness on which death is bad for its victim (in a respect) when it involves a decline from a good life. I distinguish three different backward-looking accounts of death's badness in terms of decline, and I argue for the attractiveness of one in particular. I conclude by considering how the backward-looking consideration of decline might factor into our overall account of death's badness
Aesthetics · Attractiveness · Economics · Good death · Free Will and Agency · Medicine · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Highly cited | No |
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