Moral Error Theory

Jonas Olson's Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence has four aims. First, the book aims to provide a historical background to the development of moral error theory prior to its appearance in Mackie's (1946) article, ‘A Refutation of Morals.’ Secondly, it provides a critical look at four different versions of the queerness argument. Olson contends that only one of them, the argument from irreducible normativity, succeeds. Thirdly, the book defends both moral error theory and its epistemic analogue against recent criticisms. Finally, it articulates and defends an approach to moral thought and language that Olson calls moral conservationism. In brief, moral conservationism is the view that one can continue to believe false moral claims because it is useful to do so. Chapter 1 presents an overview of the book. Here, Olson distinguishes between what he calls moderate and standard error theories. Standard error theory holds that all positive moral judgements are false because moral properties and facts do not exist. By contrast, a moderate error theory would contend only that we are systematically mistaken about some aspect of morality or other, such as the nature of moral rules or the nature of moral judgements. A moderate error theorist can therefore allow that some positive moral judgements are true. It is important for Olson's purposes that we see the moral error theory under this broader umbrella. Otherwise, some of the philosophers mentioned in the book, such as David Hume and Axel Hägerström, would not count as error theorists.

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Moral psychology · Moral reasoning · Morality · Normative ethics · Ethics in medical practice · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

• Madhyamaka Metaethics

  Open Access•Jason Dockstader•Sophia•2023

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