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Random Emeralds

Bibliographic Data

ID10691007
AuthorsSven Neth (0000-0003-4275-7581, University of Pittsburgh, corresponding author)
Year2025
Publication date2025-04-22
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqaf038
OpenAlexW4409653874
LanguageEN
References cited39

Suppose we observe many emeralds which are all green. This observation usually provides good evidence that all emeralds are green. However, the emeralds we have observed are also all grue, which means that they are either green and already observed or blue and not yet observed. We usually do not think that our observation provides good evidence that all emeralds are grue. Why? I argue that if we are in the best case for inductive reasoning, we have reason to assign low probability to the hypothesis that all emeralds are grue before seeing any evidence. My argument appeals to random sampling and the observation-independence of green, understood as probabilistic independence of whether emeralds are green and when they are observed

Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Philosophy

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    Barry Stroud•The Significance of Philosophical…•1984

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    Open Access•Jared Warren•Philosophical Studies•2023

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  • How the Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green Defeats What is New in the New Riddle of Induction

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  • A Dilemma for Solomonoff Prediction

    Open Access•Sven Neth•Philosophy of Science•2023

  • Solomonoff Prediction and Occam’s Razor

    Open Access•Tom F Sterkenburg•Philosophy of Science•2016

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    Rudolf Carnap•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1947

  • Ramifications of ‘Grue’

    Mary Hesse•The British Journal for the…•1969

  • Randomness Is Unpredictability

    Antony Eagle•The British Journal for the…•2005

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    Barry Stroud•Engagement and metaphysical…•2011

  • Fact, fiction, and forecast

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  • Preservation of independence and Goodman's riddle

    Open Access•Alexandra Zinke•The Philosophical Quarterly•2024

Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
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