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Love and unselfing

Bibliographic Data

ID10691011
AuthorsKatie H C Wong (0000-0003-1736-7346, University of Michigan, corresponding author)
Year2024
Publication date2024-07-16
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqae089
OpenAlexW4400678879
LanguageEN
References cited19

This paper examines an overlooked aspect of interpersonal love: Like morality, love demands a certain kind of impartial or disinterested vision from us. We cannot love another person well, I argue, without being capable of such impartiality. Unfortunately, our self-interested nature makes meeting love's demand for impartiality extremely difficult if not impossible. This paper unpacks and offers a solution to this difficulty. Drawing on Iris Murdoch's work on love, I suggest that we can come to appreciate our beloveds as we should through unselfing, a state of self-forgetful, disinterested appreciation of an object outside the self. When we unself, we are so deeply moved by an external object's value—e.g. a stunning sunset—that all our subjective cares and concerns disappear from view. In concluding, I suggest that the capacity for impartiality we must develop to love someone well is relevant to understanding what our moral relations demand of us

Political science · Sociology · Gender, Feminism, and Media · Media Influence and Health · Media, Gender, and Advertising · Psychology

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