Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

A Hole in the Box and a Pain in the Mouth

Bibliographic Data

ID10691074
AuthorsLaurenz Casser (0000-0001-7438-5087, The University of Texas at Austin), Laurenz C Casser, Herbert I Schiller (0000-0001-7229-9337, The University of Texas at Austin), Henry Ian Schiller (The University of Texas at Austin)
Year2021
Volume71
Issue4
Publication date2021-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqaa091
OpenAlexW3125909809
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited36

The following argument is widely assumed to be invalid: there is a pain in my finger; my finger is in my mouth; therefore, there is a pain in my mouth. The apparent invalidity of this argument has recently been used to motivate the conclusion that pains are not spatial entities. We argue that this is a mistake. We do so by drawing attention to the metaphysics of pains and holes and provide a framework for their location which both vindicates the argument's validity and explains why it appears invalid. To this end, we show that previously proposed explanations for the apparent invalidity of the argument fail. Moreover, we show that our account accommodates and explains seemingly opposing linguistic data. We conclude that the ‘pain-in-mouth argument’ does not undermine the view that pains are spatial entities

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Mistake · Political science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

  • Polysemy and puzzles about pain

    Open Access•Michelle Liu•Philosophical Psychology•2026

  • Where Pains Are

    Erlend Owesen, Arif Ahmed•Australasian Journal of Philosophy•2026

  • Parts and Places

    Roberto Casati, Achille C Varzi•Parts and Places•1999

  • Concepts

    Jerry A Fodor•Concepts•1998

  • Consciousness, Color, and Content

    Michael Tye•Consciousness, Color, and Content•2000

  • The Generative Lexicon

    James Pustejovsky•The Generative Lexicon•1995

  • Logic and Conversation

    H P Grice•Speech Acts•1975

  • Phenomenal Consciousness

    Open Access•Peter Carruthers•Phenomenal Consciousness•2000

  • Ten Problems of Consciousness

    Michael Tye•Ten Problems of Consciousness•1995

  • Polysemy and thought

    Open Access•Jake Quilty‐dunn•Mind & Language•2021

  • Are explicatures cancellable? Toward a theory of the speaker's intentionality

    Alessandro Capone•Intercultural Pragmatics•2009

  • A Representational Theory of Pains and their Phenomenal Character

    Michael Tye•Philosophical Perspectives•1995

  • Mental Pictures and Cognitive Science

    Ned Block•The Philosophical Review•1983

  • Holes and Other Superficialities

    David Lewis, Roberto Casati et al.•The Philosophical Review•1996

  • Concepts

    Jerry A Fodor•Concepts•1998

  • The cancellability test for conversational implicatures

    Open Access•Julia Zakkou•Philosophy Compass•2018

  • Syntax and semantics 9

    Open Access•Gerald Gazdar, Ewan Klein•Journal of Pragmatics•1980

Unique citing works2
Citations per year2
Citation span2026 - 2026 (1)
Citation velocitycurrent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 2
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae