Between Internalism and Externalism in Ethics
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10691181 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Evan Simpson (0000-0002-8820-0722, Memorial University of Newfoundland, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 195 |
| Pages | 201-214 |
| Publication date | 1999-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9213.00137 |
| OpenAlex | W2167211840 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 11 |
If internalism in ethics is correct, then moral beliefs necessarily motivate. Externalism rejects this thesis, holding that the relationship between beliefs and motives is only contingent. The position I develop is that both views are false. By defining a logical relationship between moral beliefs and motives that is weaker than logical necessitation, it is possible to maintain (contrary to internalism) that beliefs may occur without motives, but (contrary to externalism) that they cannot always do so. The logical point is explicated through a psychological interpretation of moral emotions that gives their constituent beliefs an inherent link to action, together with a semantic characterization of moral concepts that ties their competent use to familiarity with these emotions
Action (physics) · Epistemology · Externalism · Internalism and externalism · Interpretation (philosophy) · Linguistics · Moral disengagement · Moral psychology · Ethics in medical practice · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,17 |
| Citation span | 2003 - 2020 (18) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |