Death, Creation, and Future Bias
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10691210 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Rabenberg (0000-0001-9004-5322, University Center for Human Values, Princeton University, USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 72 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 465-477 |
| Publication date | 2022-03-31 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqab026 |
| OpenAlex | W4254682841 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 22 |
A much discussed question in the philosophy of death is whether both of the following claims are true: (1) it is at least typically appropriate to prefer dying further in the future to dying less far in the future; and (2) it is at least typically appropriate not to prefer having been created further in the past to having been created less far in the past. Some philosophers have tried to defend (1) and (2) by appeal to the alleged appropriateness of future bias—roughly, greater concern for certain goods and bads in one's future than for certain goods and bads in one's past. I argue that such approaches to defending (1) and (2) probably cannot succeed, by arguing that even if a very strong version of future bias is appropriate, it does not follow that (1) and (2) are both true. Philosophers attracted to the conjunction of (1) and (2) ought to try to defend it by appeal to something other than future bias
Appeal · Conjunction (astronomy) · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Political science · Positive economics · Free Will and Agency · Grief, Bereavement, and Mental Health · Law · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |